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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
VI. 
VINCENT LAWRENCE PHBPPS 
akaVINNYPHIPPS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20050296-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
Appellant appeals from the Judgment and Commitment to Utah State Prison 
entered March 10, 2005, in this case involving his convictions in the Seventh Judicial 
District Court for Grand County, State of Utah, for Criminal Mischief, a Second Degree 
Felony. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal in this matter 
pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §§78-2a-3(2)(e) and 77-18a-l(l)(a) (2003) and UTAH 
RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 3(a). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS, STATEMENT OF 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL, AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE #1: Did the "reasonable doubt" jury instruction presented at trial 
correctly state the law? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Whether a jury instruction correctly states the law is 
reviewable under a correction of error standard, with no particular deference given to the 
trial court's ruling. State v. Reves. 2004 Ut App 8, f 14, 84 P.3d 841, citing State v. 
Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232, 1244 (Utah 1993). Determining the propriety of the 
instructions submitted to the jury presents a question of law, which this Court reviews for 
correctness. Id. at |15, see, Ames v. Maas. 846 P.2d 468,471 (Utah App. 1993). 
ISSUE #2: Was Phipps' trial counsel ineffective for failing to invoke the 
exclusionary rule during the trial? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Where new counsel represents a defendant on appeal 
and the record is adequate to review his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on 
direct appeal, this Court reviews those claims as a matter of law. State v. Chacon, 962 
P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998). To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, " 'a 
defendant must show (1) that counsel's performance was so deficient as to fall below an 
objective standard of reasonableness and (2) that but for counsel's deficient performance 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different."' 
Wickham v. Galetka. 2002 UT 72,1 19, 61 P.3d 978 {quoting State v. Smith. 909 P.2d 
236, 243 (Utah 1995)); see also Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 686-87, 104 
S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). 
ISSUE #3: Was Phipps'trial counsel ineffective for failing to argue for admission 
of Exhibit No. 17 for impeachment purposes? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Where new counsel represents a defendant on appeal 
and the record is adequate to review his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on 
direct appeal, this Court reviews those claims as a matter of law. State v. Chacon. 962 
P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998). To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, " 'a 
defendant must show (1) that counsel's performance was so deficient as to fall below an 
objective standard of reasonableness and (2) that but for counsel's deficient performance 
there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different.'" 
Wickham v. Galetka. 2002 UT 72, J 19, 61 P.3d 978 {quoting State v. Smith. 909 P.2d 
236, 243 (Utah 1995)); see also Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 686-87, 104 
S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). 
ISSUE #4: Did the trial court commit plain error in failing to reduce Phipps' 
sentence? 
-3-
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STANDARD OF REVIEW: This Court traditionally affords the trial court wide 
latitude and discretion in sentencing. State v. Bovd. 2001 UT 30, f 31,25 P.3d 985, citing 
State v. Woodland. 945 P.2d 665, 671 (Utah 1997) {quoting State v. Gibbons. 779 P.2d 
1133, 1135 (Utah 1989)) (other citations omitted) "An appellate court will set aside a 
sentence imposed by the trial court if the sentence represents an abuse of discretion." Id. 
Sentencing requires such discretion because it "necessarily reflects the personal judgment 
of the court." Id. Thus, a sentence imposed by the trial court should be overturned only 
when it is inherently unfair or clearly excessive. Id. "An abuse of discretion results when 
the judge fails to consider all legally relevant factors or if the sentence imposed is clearly 
excessive." State v. McCovev. 803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah 1990) (quotations and 
citations omitted). 
ISSUE #5: Did the trial court err in allowing an uncertified transcript prepared 
by the State of an audio recording of a telephone call made by Phipps to be submitted to 
thejury? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Although the admission or exclusion of evidence is 
a question of law, this Court reviews a district court's decision to admit or exclude 
specific evidence for an abuse of discretion. State v. Cruz-Meza. 2003 UT 32, f 8, 76 
P.3dll65. 
-4-
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
I. UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AMENDS. V, VI and XIV 
II. UTAH CONSTITUTION, ART. I §§ 7 and 12. 
III. UTAH CODE ANN. §76-3-203. 
IV. UTAH CODE ANN. §76-3-402. 
V. UTAH CODE ANN. §76-6-106. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On July 8, 2004, Vincent Lawrence Phipps, aka Vinny Phipps (hereinafter 
"Phipps") was charged by Information in the Seventh Judicial District Court, in and for 
Grand County, State of Utah, with Criminal Mischief, a Second Degree Felony in 
violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §76-6-106(3)(b)(i). R001-R002. In an order signed August 
3, 2004, by Honorable Lyle R. Anderson, Phipps was appointed counsel herein for 
representation pertaining to this matter. R006-R009. On September 1, 2004, attorney 
William L. Benge entered his Appearance and Substitution of Counsel for further 
representation of Phipps in this matter. R015-R016. 
On October 12, 2004, the matter came before Judge Anderson for a preliminary 
hearing. R024-R025. The trial could ordered that Phipps be held over to answer to the 
charges in the Information. Id. 
-5-
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On January 20 and 21,2005, the matter came before Judge Anderson for jury trial. 
R121-R122. Neither defense counsel, the prosecuting attorney nor the trial court invoked 
the exclusionary rule at any point during the course of the trial. At the conclusion of the 
trial, Judge Anderson read the jury instructions to the jury, which included the following 
instruction pertaining to the standard of reasonable doubt: 
A defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. This presumption follows the defendant throughout the 
trial. If a defendant's guilt is not shown by a reasonable doubt, the 
defendant should be acquitted. 
The state must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt is not proof to an absolute certainty. Reasonable doubt is 
a doubt based on reason, which is reasonable in view of all the evidence. 
Reasonable doubt is not a doubt based on fancy, imagination, or wholly 
speculative possibility. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is enough proof to 
satisfy the mind, or convince the understanding of those bound to act 
conscientiously, and enough to eliminate reasonable doubt. A reasonable 
doubt is a doubt that reasonable people would entertain based upon the 
evidence in the case. 
R086. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury deliberated and returned a verdict 
convicting Phipps of Criminal Mischief, a Second Degree Felony. R095. 
On March 1, 2005, the matter came for sentencing before Judge Lyle R. Anderson. 
R096-R100. Judge Anderson sentenced Phipps for a term of not less than one year nor 
more than fifteen years to be served in the Utah State Prison, and to pay restitution in the 
total amount of $4,658.09 to Allstate Insurance. R098-R099. 
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On March 1, 2005, the trial court entered its Judgment and Commitment to Utah 
State Prison (the "Judgment") in this matter. R098-R099. On March 29, 2005, Phipps 
filed his Notice of Appeal from the Judgment. R101-R103. On April 6, 2005, Phipps 
requested that a transcript of the trial be prepared and that Grand County bear the costs of 
preparing the transcripts for appeal. R104-R108, Rl 13-R115. 
On May 25, 2005, William L. Benge filed his Motion for Leave to Withdraw as 
Counsel, citing an unreasonable financial burden upon counsel due to the fact that 
defendant was impecunious. Rl 16-R119. In its Order for Leave to Withdraw as Counsel, 
signed June 7, 2005, the trial court granted Mr. Benge's motion and counsel herein was 
appointed to represent Phipps in further proceedings before this Court. R120-R121. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about the evening of December 26, 2003, Phipps was working at Zach's, a 
pizza parlor and bar in Moab, Utah, when he noticed that a customer-Christopher 
Lawson ("Christopher")- and Phipps' brother-Nick Phipps ("Nick")-were involved in 
a scuffle. R121 at p. 105; R122 at p. 41, 115. Phipps observed Nick on top of 
Christopher in one of the booths in the restaurant and saw one of Christopher's friends, 
Tracken Johnson, grabbing at the back of Nick's coat. R122 at p. 42, 116. Phipps 
decided to try and break up the scuffle, but in the process was knocked down and hit his 
-7-
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head on a table, causing him a trip to the hospital, twelve or thirteen stitches above his 
eye, and approximately $1200.00 in doctor's bills. R121 at p. 105; R122 at pp. 42-43,90, 
116. Christopher testified that he and Nick were at the bar the rest of the night and no 
further problems occurred; however, Nick testified that he was dismissed from the bar the 
rest of that night. R121 at p. 106; R122 at p. 43. 
After his trip to the hospital, Phipps was pulled over by Tracken Johnson at 
McDonald's. R122 at p. 117. Tracken told Phipps that nobody wanted to fight anymore 
and that they should just live their lives and go their separate ways. Id. 
The next evening on or about December 27,2003, Nick had been drinking and was 
walking1 home from a friend's house when a car pulled up to him at the top of his street 
on the comer between 5th West and Westwood. R122 at pp. 44, 46, 80-81. Two of 
Christopher's friends, Terrill Johnson ("Johnson")2 and Josh Alario ("Alario"), exited 
the vehicle and approached Nick. Id. at p. 44. Alario asked Nick if he had a problem 
with Christopher, to which Nick replied in the affirmative. R122 at pp. 69-70, 78. Alario 
then physically assaulted Nick. R121 at p. 125; R122 at p. 45. Alario was later 
prosecuted and convicted of the crime. R122 at p. 64. 
1
 Nick, their mother and Phipps all testified that neither Nick nor Phipps had a driver's 
license at the time these events occurred. R122 at p. 44, 81,118. 
2
 Tracken and Terrill Johnson are brothers. R122atp. 45. 
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Due to the altercation, Nick was unable to walk the few blocks to his house, so he 
called his mother on his cell phone at approximately midnight to 12:30 a.m., and she 
came and picked him up in her car. R122 at pp. 46-47, 80. Nick's mother testified that 
there was blood all over the place and that she had a difficult time getting him in the car 
by himself. Id. at p. 80. When Nick and his mother arrived back at home, they decided to 
contact Phipps, who was drinking at Zach's that night, to inform him of what had 
happened. Id. at pp. 47-48, 86, 116-117. Phipps became upset and decided he needed to 
come home, so Nick and their mother picked up Phipps and went back to their home at 
approximately 12:30 am. Id. at pp. 48-49. 
Phipps and Nick were very upset over what had occurred. R122 at p. 49, 82. 
Phipps wanted to find somebody and settle the score and he did not care if it was 
Christopher, Tracken Johnson or Alario. Id. at pp. 50, 69, 98, 117, 120. Nick and 
Phipps' mother tried to calm them and get them to let the authorities handle the situation. 
Id. at pp. 69, 82, 119. At approximately 1:00 a.m.3, Phipps left the house walking either 
southward or westward to go to Christopher's house. R121 at p. 133; R122 at pp. 52-53, 
83-84, 119. Within five minutes of Phipps' departure from the house, Nick and their 
3
 Nick testified that any of the time frames that he provided on direct examination were 
estimates of where he was and the times he was there. R122 at p. 66. 
-9-
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mother intercepted Phipps4 walking along the street and took him to his brother-in-law's 
home to try and calm him down. R121 at p. 133; R122 at pp. 52-54,121. 
They arrived at Phipps9 brother-in-law's home between 1:00 a.m. and 1:30 a.m. 
R122 at p. 55,104,122. Nick and Phipps' mother dropped them off and stayed in the car 
for a moment to pray then came in the house about five minutes later. R122 at p. 73, 85, 
104, 123. While at his brother-in-law's home, Phipps made several phone calls to try and 
locate Johnson and Alario and to see who could go with him to speak with them about 
what had happened. Id. at p. 56. At one point, Phipps locked himself in a back room so 
no one could take the phone from him, obtained a phone number from his girlfriend for 
Johnson, and made an angry phone call to him at approximately 1:28 a.m. regarding what 
had occurred. R121 at p. 137; R122 at p. 56, 123, 133. Afterward, Phipps came out of 
the back room and spoke with his sister on the phone, who was able to calm him down. 
R121 at pp. 139-140; R122 at p. 58. 
4
 While Officer Guerrero first testified that Phipps told him he was picked up on 5th 
West, he then testified that Phipps was walking down 5th West and told him he was picked up 
around Marcus Court. R121 at pp. 133,142-143,151. Guerrero testified that Nick told him they 
picked up Phipps "about halfway between their house and their brother-in-law's house," which 
Guerrero said would be McCormick Avenue. Id. Nick testified that they picked up Phipps 
somewhere between McCormick and Westwood. R122 at p. 53. Phipps' mother testified that 
Phipps may have only made it to the next block from the house. Id. at p. 84. Marcus Court and 
McCormick Avenue are three to four blocks from one another. Id. at p. 151. 
-10-
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Once Nick and Phipps were calm and a little more sober, around approximately 
2:00 to 2:30 a.m., their mother took Nick and Phipps with her in her vehicle and dropped 
Nick of at their house. R121 at p. 140; R122 at p. 125. Nick then contacted the police 
around 2:45 a.m. regarding the assault and Officer Frankie Lopez responded to their 
home around 3:00 a.m. R122 at pp. 58-59, 76, 88. Nick and Phipps' mother then took 
Phipps to Alice Parmenter's house, who is Phipps' girlfriend's grandmother, where he 
remained the rest of the evening into the next day. R121 at p. 140; R122 at pp. 57-58, 88, 
109,113-114,125. 
Sometime between 3:00 a.m. and sunrise, after Officer Lopez made a report 
respecting the assault and Nick and his mother went to bed, Phipps' mother got a phone 
call. R122 at p. 91. Phipps' mother answered the phone and a male voice on the other 
end told her to tell Nick and Phipps not to worry about it, "we took care of it." Id at p. 
92. When Phipps' mother inquired as to what they meant, they said "this ain't the first 
time they've done this" and then they hung up. Id Phipps' mother did not recognize the 
voice. Id Phipps' mother did not report this phone call to law enforcement until she was 
interviewed in May of 2004 because she did not find it important since she knew Nick 
and Phipps had not been involved in the incident. Id at p. 94-95. 
-11-
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On the morning of Sunday, December 28, 20035, Christopher's girlfriend, Becky 
Bird, had gone outside to get things together to go snowboarding with his brother when 
Terrill Johnson came around and Becky and Terrill noticed that the windows were broken 
out of the Lawson's three vehicles-a Suburban belonging to Christopher's mother, a Ford 
truck belonging to Christopher's father, and Christopher's Jeep Cherokee. R121 at pp. 
70-73, 101-102. Christopher went outside to check the vehicles, noticed the windows 
smashed in and a dent in the rear of his vehicle, then went inside to tell his parents what 
had happened. Id. at p. 102. 
At approximately 7:00 a.m. on Sunday, December 28, 2003, the Lawson's awoke 
and were informed that something had happened to their vehicles during the previous 
night. R121 at pp. 70, 82. The Lawson's checked on their vehicles and found that the 
windows in each of them had been smashed in and there were scratches, marks and a dent 
on the back of Christopher's Jeep Cherokee. Id. at pp. 70-73. The Lawson's contacted 
local law enforcement sometime between 7:00 a.m. and 7:30 a.m. Id. at pp. 73, 84. Mrs. 
Lawson then contacted her friend, Rhonda MacAdams ("MacAdams") to come as a 
comfort to her. Id. at p. 94. 
5
 Throughout the trial, parties and counsel made reference to December 23rd, 28th and 29th 
as dates the incident occurred. The trial court clarified that December 28th was the Sunday in 
question. R122atp. 96. 
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Officer Eddie Guerrero of the Moab City Police Department arrived at the 
Lawson's residence at approximately 7:45 a.m., took pictures of the damage, and filled 
out a police report. R121 at pp. 73, 122-123. While filling out the police report, Terrill 
Johnson arrived at the Lawson's residence and informed them about the angry phone 
message he had received from Phipps the night before. Id. at p. 73. Officer Guerrero 
asked Terrill to bring his cell phone to the police station to record the message. Id. at p. 
74. 
After Officer Guerrero left the scene, Christopher was inspecting the damage and 
noticed what he believed to be one to five pin-drop-size dots of blood splattered, not 
smeared, on one of the damaged back drivers' side windows. R121 at pp. 75, 95, 98-99, 
103-104. Terrill had not yet left to the police station, so Mrs. Lawson testified that 
Christopher asked Terrill to also inform Officer Guerrero that they had found blood. Id. 
at pp. 75-76. MacAdams testified that Mrs. Lawson asked Terrill to inform Officer 
Guerrero. Id. at p. 96. 
After leaving the Lawson's residence, Officer Guerrero attempted to contact Nick 
and Phipps mat morning, but found that they were not at home. R121 at p. 126. Officer 
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Guerrero then went to the police station to await Terrill Johnson's arrival with the cell 
phone so he could record the message left by Phipps6. Id 
During this time, Christopher's father telephoned Nick and Phipps' mother, 
accusing her sons of causing the damage to their vehicles and demanding that they 
confess or get their friends to confess if it was friends of theirs. Id. at pp. 80-81. Nick 
then telephoned Christopher, stating that he wanted to come over to their house to solve 
the problem, to which Christopher's mother told Nick not to come over and not to call 
anymore. Id. at p. 79. Christopher's mother was worried about Nick coming to their 
house after the phone conversations, so she contacted law enforcement again, informing 
them about Nick's phone call and about the blood Christopher found. Id. at pp. 76-77. 
Sergeant Mike Wyler and Officer Guerrero both responded to the second call at 
approximately 11:00 a.m., about two hours after Officer Guerrero had left the Lawson's 
residence. Id. at pp. 76-77, 126, 131, 159. The Moab City police detective, Craig 
Shumway, was never called to the scene. Id. at p. 159. 
6
 The cell phone message was recorded by Officer Guerrero and transcribed by Janet 
Lowe, an executive assistant for the council and county administrator. Rl21 at p. 185. The 
audiotape was played for the jury and, on objection from Phipps' counsel, the transcripts were 
submitted with instruction from Judge Anderson that the tape was the evidence to be relied upon 
and not the transcript. R121 at p. 137,143-144. 
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Officer Guerrero testified that he did not see the drops on the first visit to the 
Lawson's residence due to the time of day and the fact that the sun was not all the way up 
yet, causing a reflection due to the tinting of the window. R121 at p. 128. Officer 
Guerrero testified that he observed four or five drops "spattered" on both drivers' side 
windows when he arrived on the second call and that they were brown in color due to his 
red-green color blindness. R121 at pp. 127-128. Officer Guerrero did not see any blood 
on the ground near the vehicle. Id. at p. 157. Officer Guerrero could not tell how old the 
blood spatters were, but they were dry. Id. at p. 160. 
Officer Guerrero used sterile saline and a sterile cotton swab and removed the 
drops from the window using the saline and the cotton swab. Id. Officer Guerrero 
placed the swabs into a sealed container and later assigned them their own property 
number and shipped them to the crime lab. Id. A picture was taken of the window where 
the blood drops were found; however, the blood drops were too "teeny" to be seen in the 
photo. R121 at pp. 109,130. No separate pictures were taken of the blood drops. R121 
at p. 107. 
After leaving the Lawson's for a second time that day, Officer Guerrero was able 
to make contact with Nick and Phipps and interview them at their home. R121 at p. 131. 
Phipps denied any involvement in the damage to the Lawson's vehicles. Id. Officer 
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Guerrero asked Phipps how Paul Shelton7 knew about the windows and Phipps told him 
he did not know. R122 at p. 126. Officer Guerrero testified Paul Shelton could have 
been a suspect, but that he was awaiting a written statement from Johnson to interview 
Paul Shelton regarding this incident and that he never received that statement. R121 at p. 
154. Officer Guerrero had only just spoken with Paul Shelton in the two weeks prior to 
the trial in this matter. Id. at p. 155. 
Officer Guerrero interviewed the friend of a neighbor of the Lawson's, Liz 
Northrop, whose written statement indicated had seen an "...older silver Tarus [sic] type 
car..." on the Lawson's street around 1:30 a.m. on December 28, 2003. R121 at pp. 175, 
188-189; Exhibit No. 18. Officer Guerrero took pictures of Phipps' mother's vehicle for 
comparison purposes. Id. Phipps' mother's vehicle is a gold-bronze Ford Tempo. Id. at 
p. 176. 
When shown the photo of Phipps' mother's vehicle at trial, Liz Northrop testified 
that the car in the photo was almost exactly what she saw that night. Id. at p. 190. Liz 
Northrop then testified contrary to her written statement that the vehicle she observed was 
"an older Taurus, kind of Tempo looking, tannish-brown vehicle, four door." Id. at pp. 
7
 Officer Guerrero testified that Paul Shelton is an individual known to law enforcement 
due to having dealt with him in that capacity. R121 at p. 153. 
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190-191; Exhibit No. 18. When the discrepancy was pointed out to her, Liz Northrop 
testified that her prior written statement was inaccurate and that she may have mixed up 
the color because her friend drives a silver vehicle. Id. at p. 192. 
Officer Guerrero also interviewed the Lawson's next door neighbor, Aaron 
Rodman. Aaron Rodman's written statement dated December 28, 2003, states that he 
was in his bedroom playing a game and heard some yelling and a "thud" outside about 
1:30 a.m. to 2:00 a.m. See, Exhibit No. 17 8. Aaron Rodman testified at trial that he had 
heard yelling and loud bangs, like glass breaking, around 1:30 a.m. on December 28, 
2003, while he was up watching a movie. R121 at p. 179. Aaron Rodman testified that 
he walked outside and heard more than one person running up the street but it was too 
dark to see them. Id. at pp. 179-181. 
Officer Guerrero testified that, during his interview with Phipps on the day the 
incident occurred, he did not notice any cuts on Phipps' hands and that Phipps' older 
injury over his eye had stitches and a steri-strip on it. Id. at p. 157. Officer Guerrero did 
not see any blood on Phipps' clothing nor anything that might have spattered blood on 
8
 Exhibit No. 17 was not received by the trial court based on its conclusion that the 
statement did not contain any statements that were inconsistent with Mr. Rodman's testimony. 
R121 at p. 183. The oversight in having Rodman's statement admitted for purposes of 
impeachment is addressed in the argument herein pertaining to trial counsel's effectiveness. 
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him. Id. Later, Officer Guerrero obtained a search warrant for a sample of Nick and 
Phipps' blood and sent those samples to the crime lab for DNA testing9. Id. at p. 146. 
After obtaining the blood samples, Officer Guerrero conducted a second interview with 
Nick. Id. at p. 147. In May of 2004, the results of the DNA test indicated that the blood 
spatters on Christopher's vehicle matched the blood sample provided by Phipps. R122 at 
p. 33. 
The repairs to all three vehicles were made at Rick's Glass, which is owned and 
operated by Rick Thompson ("Thompson"). R121 at p. 77, 115. The total damage to the 
Suburban cost $2164.22. Id. at pp. 77-78. The total damage to the Ford truck was 
$508.16. Id. at p. 78. The total damage to the Jeep Cherokee was $1985.71 for the 
windows and $1689.54 for the auto body work. Id. at pp. 79, 91. Thompson testified that 
the rear passenger window of the Jeep Cherokee was scratched, but was not replaced as a 
trade off for the Lawson's $500.00 deductible with their insurance company. Id. at p. 
117-118. The $500.00 was included in the total damage amount of $1985.71 to the Jeep 
Cherokee. Id. at p. 119; see also, State's Exhibit No. 13. 
9
 Officer Guerrero obtained two separate blood samples from Phipps on February 3, 
2004, and on February 16,2004, since the first sample was obtained under an invalid search. 
R121 at p. 148-149. Officer Guerrero testified that he scheduled appointments for Phipps on the 
first warrant, but Phipps missed two of those appointments. R121 at pp. 163-164; R122 at p. 
139. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court determined in a decision handed down on June 7, 2005, 
that the phrase "obviate all reasonable doubt" in a reasonable doubt jury instruction 
carried with it the substantial risk of causing a juror to find guilt based on a degree of 
proof below beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Reves. 2005 UT 33.1f30. With such a 
risk inherent in the use of the questionable phrase, a juror may have found Phipps guilty 
under a standard less than that of beyond a reasonable doubt, violating Phipps' due 
process rights under both UTAH CONSTITUTION, Art. I § 12 and UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION, AMEND V. Although not specifically objected to at trial, this Court has 
previously held that the "[exceptional circumstances concept may be employed as basis 
for reaching issues not properly preserved for appeal, where a change in law or the settled 
interpretation of law colors the failure to have raised an issue at trial." State ex. rel. T.M.. 
2003 UT App 191, fl6,73 P.3d 959. 
The purpose behind excluding witnesses from the courtroom during trial is to 
prevent witnesses from being influenced or tainted by the testimony of other witnesses. 
Astill v. Clark. 956 P.2d 1081 (Utah App. 1998). As articulated by John Henry Wigmore, 
this rule is ". . .(next to cross-examination) one of the greatest engines that the skill of 
man has ever invented for the detection of liars in a court of justice." Wigmore on 
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Evidence, Vol. 6 §1838 (p. 463). A motion for this legal test of credibility of witnesses 
by sequestration is almost universally granted and good practice is to grant the motion in 
absence of a compelling reason to deny it, since the person making the request believes 
the exclusion will aid in the fairness of his trial. State v. Brown. 515 P.2d 1008, 1010 
(Wash.App. 1973). Phipps' trial counsel, William Benge, rendered ineffective assistance 
of counsel by failing to invoke the exclusionary rule at any point during the trial, causing 
two vital State's witnesses to conform their testimony to that of other witnesses. 
UTAH CODE ANN. §76-3-402(1) states as follows: 
If the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense of 
which the defendant was found guilty and to the history and character of the 
defendant, concludes it would be unduly harsh to record the conviction as 
being for that degree of offense established by statute and to sentence the 
defendant to an alternative normally applicable to that offense, the court 
may unless otherwise specifically provided by law enter a judgment of 
conviction for the next lower degree of offense and impose sentence 
accordingly. 
UTAH CODE ANN. §76-6-106 (3)(b) sets forth the levels to be charged for criminal 
mischief, as it specifically pertains to this matter, stating that ". . .any other violation of 
this section is a: (i) second degree felony if the actor's conduct causes or is intended to 
cause pecuniary loss equal to or in excess of $5,000 in value; (ii) third degree felony if the 
actor's conduct causes or is intended to cause pecuniary loss equal to or in excess of 
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$1,000 but is less than $5,000 in value..." (emphasis added). The trial court committed 
plain error by failing to reduce Phipps sentence when the alleged victim provided 
information that the damage was in an amount in line with a third degree felony rather 
than a second degree felony. Alternatively, Benge again rendered ineffective assistance 
by failing to move to reduce Phipps sentence based on this information 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently highlighted four important procedural 
protections when the government offers a transcript in a criminal case: (1) the trial judge 
should review[ ] the transcript for accuracy; (2) the defense counsel should be allowed to 
highlight alleged inaccuracies and to introduce alternative versions; (3) the jury should be 
instructed that the tape, rather than the transcript, was evidence; and (4) the jury should be 
allowed to compare the transcript to the tape and hear counsel's arguments as to the 
meaning of the conversations. United States v. Dekado. 357 F.3d 1061, 1070 (9th 
Cir.2004). In the instant case, Phipps9 Sixth Amendment rights to a fair trial were 
violated when the trial court admitted a transcript prepared by a State employee of an 
audio recording of a telephone call made by Phipps, by only instructing the jury as to the 
third procedural protection contained in Delgado. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE REASONABLE DOUBT JURY INSTRUCTION 
FAILED TO ACCURATELY STATE THE LAW 
No person accused in the United States may be convicted of a crime unless each 
element of the offense has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship. 397 
U.S. 358, 362, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) (emphasis added). The United 
States Supreme Court has assigned this standard of proof constitutional status, linking it 
to both the Fifth Amendment right to due process of law and the Sixth Amendment right 
to a jury trial. Sullivan v. Louisiana. 508 U.S. 275,278 (1993); Winship. 397 U.S. at 362, 
364. "[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with 
which he is charged." Winship. 397 U.S. at 364,90 S.Ct. at 1073,25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). 
The Utah Supreme Court has recently overturned its holding in State v. Robertson. 
932 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1997) setting forth a three-part test for determining whether a 
reasonable doubt jury instruction was improper. State v. Reyes. 2005 UT 33, ^[1. The 
first part of Robertson required the instruction to indicate that the State must "obviate all 
reasonable doubt." The original concept of this prong appeared "...to derive from a fear 
that in ascertaining the conviction of the truth of a charge against a defendant, a juror 
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might misapply the 'beyond a reasonable doubt' standard unless she is required to search 
out, confront, and defeat reasonable doubt with evidence." Reyes at ^ [25. 
The Utah Supreme Court revisited this prong in Reyes and determined to abandon 
it based on the fact that the phrase "obviate all reasonable doubt" carried with it the 
substantial risk of causing a juror to find guilt based on a degree of proof below beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Reyes at |30. The Utah Supreme Court undertook the following 
analysis of this issue: 
f 25 The court of appeals found merit in Mr. Reyes's claim that the trial 
court erred when it failed to expressly instruct that the State's proof must 
"obviate all reasonable doubt" as mandated by Robertson. Id. at 1 19. The 
"obviate all reasonable doubt" test found life in Justice Stewart's dissent in 
State v. Ireland, 113 P.2d 1375, 1380-82 (Utah 1989) (Stewart, J., 
dissenting). There, Justice Stewart took issue with an instruction that 
equated "beyond a reasonable doubt" with "an abiding conviction of the 
truth of the charge." Id. He reasoned that since the standard to be applied is 
"beyond a reasonable doubt," it followed that any definition of the standard 
must reference the obstacle-reasonable doubt—to be overcome by the 
evidence, and must convey the principle that the State must surmount the 
obstacle of reasonable doubt to justify a conviction. Id. The "obviate all 
reasonable doubt" concept appears to derive from a fear that in ascertaining 
the conviction of the truth of a charge against a defendant, a juror might 
misapply the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard unless she is required to 
search out, confront, and defeat reasonable doubt with evidence. 
Tf 26 Insightful and important as Justice Stewart's image of "beyond a 
reasonable doubt" may be, his suggestion that the jury be instructed to 
"obviate all reasonable doubt" is both linguistically opaque and 
conceptually suspect. Not every jury will confront evidence in its 
deliberations sufficient to create a reasonable doubt. The notion of 
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"obviating" doubt is cumbersome at best where proof is scant or lacking in 
credibility. In these instances, a description of "beyond a reasonable doubt" 
that asks jurors to rate the magnitude of their conviction concerning the 
strength of the evidence imparts a more accurate and useful concept of 
"beyond a reasonable doubt" than does a construct that requires jurors to 
identify doubts and assess whether the evidence overcomes them, A 
universal application of the notion that the State must "obviate all 
reasonable doubt" can be achieved only by tying it to the concept of the 
presumption of innocence. If innocence is thought of as an array of inchoate 
reasonable doubts that the State must overcome to attain a conviction, it 
follows that the State must "obviate reasonable doubts" in every case. We 
do not, however, endorse this unwieldy view of the presumption of 
innocence. 
f 27 The process suggested by the "obviate all reasonable doubt" standard is 
also flawed because, contraiy to its purpose, it tends to diminish the degree 
of proof necessary to convict and in that respect violates the Victor 
standard. The "obviation" of doubt contemplates a two-step undertaking: 
the identification of the doubt and a testing of the validity of the doubt 
against the evidence. This process suggests a back and forth disputation of a 
doubt's merits, all to the end of determining whether the evidence is 
sufficient to "obviate" the doubt. The "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard 
does not, however, condition a conclusion that a doubt is reasonable on an 
ability either to articulate the doubt or to state a reason for it. An 
unarticulated conviction that the State has failed to meet its burden of proof 
will serve as a legitimate basis to acquit. 
*8 % 28 To the extent that the Robertson "obviate" test would permit the 
State to argue that it need only obviate doubts that are sufficiently defined, 
the test works to improperly diminish the State's burden. Writing in the 
Notre Dame Law Review, Professor Steve Sheppard criticized the 
expanding prominence of the requirement that doubts be articulated. Steve 
Sheppard, The Metamorphoses of Reasonable Doubt: How Changes in the 
Burden of Proof Have Weakened the Presumption of Innocence, 78 Notre 
Dame L.Rev. 1165 (2003). Professor Sheppard summarized the central vice 
of this trend this way: 
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A troubling conclusion that arises from the difficulties of the 
requirement of articulability is that it hinders the juror who 
has a doubt based on the belief that the totality of the evidence 
is insufficient. Such a doubt lacks the specificity implied in an 
obligation to "give a reason," an obligation that appears 
focused on the details of the arguments. Yet this is precisely 
the circumstance in which the rhetoric of the law, particularly 
the presumption of innocence and the state burden of proof, 
require acquittal. 
Id. at 1213. 
1 29 Central to our reconsideration of the merits of the "obviate all 
reasonable doubt" element of Robertson is our belief that the exacting 
demands of the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard can be clearly and 
fairly communicated through an affirmative description of the degree of 
conviction that must be attained by a juror based on the evidence. We see 
little to be gained by including within a "beyond a reasonable doubt" 
instruction the potentially confusing concept that every defendant is entitled 
to a presumption of reasonable doubt, which the State's evidence must obviate. 
| 30 Because we conclude that "the obviate all reasonable doubt" element 
of the Robertson test carries with it the substantial risk of causing a juror to 
find guilt based on a degree of proof below beyond a reasonable doubt, we 
expressly abandon it. 
Reyes at ^ 24-30. 
In the instant matter, the "reasonable doubt" jury instruction expressly indicates 
that "...proof beyond a reasonable doubt is enough to . . .eliminate reasonable doubt," 
which is substantively the same as the prong in Robertson requiring the jury instruction to 
"obviate all reasonable doubt." R086. As indicated by the Utah Supreme Court, this 
instruction carries with it the substantial risk that a juror found Phipps guilty based on a 
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degree of proof below beyond a reasonable doubt. With such a risk inherent in the use of 
the phrase "eliminate reasonable doubt," a juror may have found Phipps guilty under a 
standard less than that of beyond a reasonable doubt, violating Phipps due process rights 
under both the UTAH CONSTITUTION and UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
While this issue surrounding the reasonable doubt jury instruction was not 
preserved by trial counsel at the trial in this matter, this Court should review the matter 
based upon exceptional circumstances. This Court has previously held that the 
"[exceptional circumstances concept may be employed as basis for reaching issues not 
properly preserved for appeal, where a change in law or the settled interpretation of law 
colors the failure to have raised an issue at trial." State ex. rel. TJML 2003 UT App 191, 
Tfl6,73 P.3d 959. The original decision was handed down by this Court in State v. Reyes 
on January 15, 2004, upholding the three-part test in Robertson, and the prong requiring 
the use of the language "obviate all reasonable doubt." 2004 UT App 8, 84 P.3d 84. 
Review was granted by the Utah Supreme Court in that matter in May of 2004. The trial 
in the instant matter was held January 20 and 21, 2005, while review of Reyes was 
pending. The Opinion by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Reves. abandoning the 
three-part test in Robertson was handed down on June 7,2005. It is clear that this change 
in law, overturning an eight (8) year precedent in Robertson was clearly an unsettled 
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interpretation of the law that colored the ability of Phipps' trial counsel to raise the issue 
surrounding the reasonable doubt jury instruction. 
II. TRIAL COUNSEL^S INEFFECTIVE 
FOR FAILING TO INVOKE THE EXCLUSIONARY 
X AT THE TRIAL 
Where new coupadTrepresents a defendapJ^rtTappeal and the regpfd is adequate to 
review his cj i^ifis of ineffective assi§Jarf£e of counsel on dijpef^ppeal, this Court reviews 
T962 P.2d 48, 50 (UtaJ>H$98). To 
prevail on an iijpflfective assistance of>*rfinsel claim, " fa defend^jrf'must show (1) that 
counsejy^performance was^ef^deficient as to fall bgklw an objective standard of 
reasonableness and (2Khat but for counsel's deficient performance thejpHB'a reasonable 
probability t^ srf'the outcome of the^ hrtal would have been-*drfferent.' " Wickham v. 
TP.3d978 {quoting, tatev. Smith. 909 P.2dJ36fl43 (Utah 
1995)); see c . WasHng*o1i466 
L.Ed.2d^f4 (1984). 
In a casepertaimng to the violatioj^ffan exclusion order,toe^Jtah Supreme Cpurt 
has stated tbat^the onus showjj^wherein he has been^c5uaiced by a ruling opfte lower 
caurTfalls upon the^*e?endant." State \,JBffi. 827 P.2d 954 £ 1992). A 
defendant must "pointf] to inconsistencies in the record or other evidence which would 
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show wherein he hasJ^En prejudiced/'Jrf^c/Y/«g State v. Carlson, 635 P.2d 72 (Utah 
1981). "Tjprf^ requirement th^aefendants demonstrate^uier than merely allege, 
s.. .has evenjpudnger application to a cjpimof ineffective assistance of counsel, 
when defendantr only complaint is thaj*€bunsel did not request theexdusion sooner; 
,Mr ^MW^ 
^^ ^ ^ 
The purpose behjjltTexcluding witnesses &dm the courtroom during trial is to 
prevent witnesse^drom being influenced a^ainted by the testimony of other witnesses. 
Astillv.qdfc956 P.2d 1081 (Utajj^pp. 1998). As articulatedhjii^iHenry Wigmore, 
thiypffle is ". . .(next to cra^examination) one of th^greatest engines that the skill of 
Tnan has ever invenjro for the detection of HpKin a court of justice." Wigmore on 
Evidence, Yoljo §1838 (p. 463). A majron for this legal test ot^dibility of witnesses 
by sequgptfation is almost univeipdlly granted and goocy^ P c^tice is to grant the motion in 
B of a compelling jpdson to deny it, sincere person making the request believes 
Mr —i 
the exclusion will a*Tin the fairness of hi^rial. State v. Browi^l5 P.2d 1008, 1010 
(Wash.App.tf73). 
ler jurisdictions ghj^helpful insight into^he purpose behind 
rule. A New Jersey ccpdrput it plainly whejtflf stated that "[t] 
Mr 
noted early in our State v. Zellers. 7 NJ.L. 200, 226 (Sup.Ct.1824), where Chief Justice 
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Kirkpatrick observed tha^'We have often madejjiles to that effect, to prevent their 
hearing what ti^dflier witnesses detail jjvtffeir evidence, for theJWSs a witness hears of 
anothepKrestimony the mor^Jifcely is he to declare>Hfs own knowledge simply and 
{biassed/" State yjf^iiliams. 29 N.J. 27.JjrfA2d 22. "The purpo^ot the rule is to 
elicit the tryUCunveil the false anjj^romote the ends of JjKSflce." Moore v. Com. 323 
S.JpdH 577 (Ky. 1959). J^Hle 'Rule' serves two jpifoses. Initially, it prevents witnesses 
from tailoring, consciously or unconsciqu^yTtheir testimony to fit tha*<ffother witnesses. 
Secondly^ flfi the cases of witneislFs testifying for the s^afeside, it enhances the jury's 
to detect falseho/rfTby exposing inconsjgjdlcies in their testimony?Jlk€generally, 
Ex parte Robeson. 731 S.W.2d 5Jj^566 (TexCrimAppj,^^ Allen v. State. 536 
S.W.24^64, 367 (Tex.CpiffApp.1976); Carli^vT State. 451 S.W.2d 511, 512 
.Crim.App.l97J»rKellevv. State. 8J^5.W.2d 168 (Texas App. - Austin 124Hrine 
purposes oj^ Tsequestration oj^fare to prevent a witness frorn^wntorming his or her 
testimony to that of ojjrifwitnesses and to discourage^Hrication and collusion. Peoj; 
v. Wood. 743>jr5d 422 (Colo.1987); People^Cashner. 77 P.3d 787, 2Q0^WL 540*08 
(Colo^pp.2003); see also CRE6J^<Teders v. United States^4g5 U. 
47 L.Ed.2d 592 (19T^sequestering witnesses restrains them from tailoring their 
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testimony to that of eajlter witnesses and aids in detecting testimony that is less than 
sandid). Peop)gf. Melendez. 80 P.3d 88^Colo.App.,2003)> 
shown below, in th^^rfstant matter the e#dusionary rule was not in 
itnesses were alloAjjfrcTto remain in thejp«rtut room during otherjjjklfesses' testimonies. 
Two witnes Twho testified on betfalf of the State had syja$t!antially different testimonies 
than/tfiat of their originaj/^tatements and their j€§!imonies conformed to that of other 
witnesses who testjfled before them. 
A. >TPhipps' Trial Couifsel Was Ineffective For^Kfiling to Recognize the 
Impeachment Erfrposes of Aaron Rodmajp^Original Statement. 
On direct e> Wion by the State prosecptdr, Aaron Rodman testified that on the 
night of Deceig)^ 28, 2003, he was wajpffing a movie around l:3(^rii when he heard 
I bangs, windows breajr outside. R121 at pj^0: However in Rodman's 
statement dated Depmiber 28, 2003, he stajp«nnat he was in his bedroom playing 
a game early that moprfmg when he heard^/rhud" and "some yelU*^ around 1:30 a.m. 
to 2:00 a.m. aiuJHieard some peopl^rarming each way up tijp^lock. See, Exhibit No. 17 
(not admitted at trial). 
At trial, Mr^l&dman's original stej^nent was offered as Exhibit No. 17 by 
Phipps' trial counsel, William Benge, and objected to by the State as a hearsay statement. 
X 
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that 
t at p. 182. Bengey-incficated he was offering the exhibit as proof of being inconsistent 
with Rodmafrs original testimony, but only to the extept-that Benge had thought Rodman 
pr^rlbusly testified tjbtafhe had actually seejvp'eople running up^ tihe street rather than just 
hearing mejp'fWiing up the streets T his statement* Seated. Id. 
not its recollection that Mr. Rod nan had testified a i seen anyone, 
id the trial court^sked Benge iftirff was his only reaseflff for offering the exhibit. R121 
at p. \Z2.Jgkn%Q still offered'it and the State sjeoa by their objection^ftfat p. 183. The 
1 that".. Jrtnas to be offered^ror a prior mconsisjenfor inconsistent statement. 
Inconsistentjjraen attacking. ^Insistent when (ig^cnble). If you are attacking, then it 
has to>e inconsistent. Lmdn't see that. So^ojection sustained." R121 ^p^T83. 
The court/K(I not allow Rojjirain's statement to be admj^rasince Benge failed to 
recognize^md argue the inconsistencies that did exfe^nRodman's statement versusHffis 
testimony. Comparer. Vol. I, pp. 181-l^with Exhibit No. 17. Rg0arin*s statement 
indicated he w^Bplaying a game jjjjKrTieard a "thud." Exhibij^ ND. 17. Rodman testy 
that he^Ts watching a mprfS and heard "loud bangj^indows break" onfe 3e. R121 at 
p.lf9. It is clear/«nat Rodman's statemen^Kould have be^C^dmitted to challenge 
Rodman's^ifedibility; however, BejjgeTailed to recogi i these inconsisteffeles since he 
was focused on the fact tfcarlie believed Rodman had testified that he saw, rather than 
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heard, someone rujjirffig up the street. Id. at p. 182. Rodman conformed his testimony to 
that of podf witnesses whom jj^lfad heard testify/dde to the failure to invoke the 
ex£Jkfsionary rule. 
Rodmairj^ard testimony ftprffseveral witnesse^rfior to his taking the stand who 
^r^ ^r^ .^r^ 
had stateiTChat this was j ^ a s e in which sevej#Tcar windows had beenjbroken in the 
nirclle of the nigh^lhe trial in this majtCT was held nearly 13 mpfffhs after the incident 
at issue had^curred. As most rgjr^ onable people would, EHxlman must have determined 
as h^Gard the other wi tness testify that the soujads he heard that night must not have 
Jeen a 'thud,5' but rnufl have been "loud ban^C windows break," otherwise, he would not 
have been calleras a State's witnessjm this case. Given the it had passed since 
the incidepn and the fact that Hodman's was one of onjj^wo witnesses who aided in 
determining when the incMrent occurred, it is clear tjrat Phipps was prejudiced by Benge's 
failure to argue tha^nconsistencies that dUT^exist in Rodman's ^ t&ement versus his 
testimony anchor failing to invoke the exclusionary rule. 
Is difficult to judge the affect a matter of credijiflity would have uporf a jury had 
sen given the oppq^tmity to consider Redman's inconsistent^btement in its 
deliberations. Had th^ury discredited RodKfan, the time in whid^he incident occurred 
would have been left to question and fne jury may have gi*£fi more credibility to Phipps' 
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alibi defense. EhflSps' was prejudiced^ 
Rodmaa^statement and testii 
enge's ineffectiveness with respect to 
B. Liz Npffhrop Conforme^fTer Testimony to Thpj the Prior 
lesses, as Evidenc&riSy Her Prior Statement 
ewed the friend q^^teighbor of the Lawson's, Liz 
statement indicato*r*she had seen an "...older silver Tarus [sic] 
icer Guerrero 
lorthrop, whose 
type car.^Sh Christopher's stree^ GFound 1:30 a.m. on December 28 
1-189; Exhibit N ^ t T Officer Guerrero took pi 
R121 at pp. 
of Phipps' mother's vehicle 
for comparisonndrposes. Id. Phipps' mojh^r^vehicle is a gold-bronze Ford Tempo. 
R121 atVT76. 
Liz Northrop tesJjKea at trial, contrary to hejairfriften statement, that the vehicle she 
observed on jb>HIight in question wa^drxnder Taurus, kind of Tempo looking, tannish-
browj^ehicle, four door.'^i^t pp. 190-191; Exhibit NoJ^PflSen shown the photo of 
Phipps' mother's>ducle at trial, Liz Nortof^stif ied that the car in the php^was 
almost exj^ rfly what she saw thaJ^ rttgTit. Id. at p. 190. When**e*aTscrepancy in her 
statement was pointedjplffb her, Liz NorthropJ e^tfififed that her prior written^ 
was inaccur§J^nd that she mayjjj^^mixed up the color because her friend drives a 
silver vehicle. Id. at p. 
N X, 
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Northrop testifi^a after the allegpcKvictims and th^nvestigating police officer. 
The police^rfftcer, Edward Giadiero, testifiedJjjan^hipps' rngj^^nTvehicle is a gold-
brgjj*!eFord Tempo^rffa recognized it J fa the same cb shown to NorthrppC R121 at 
p. 176. ItJj^Jlear from the ijjpmsistencies h f^e^ f statement that Nojgflrop had conformed 
hei>testimony to thaLpfrche other ses on Benge's faij*re to invoke the exclusionary 
rule at the of the trial 
to invoke thg*«xclusionary rule Phipps in that 
Northrop wasiHE only witness c^ HfSd by the State toJpdFcate that Phipps' mother's car 
j^icinity of thejHeged victim's hous^rme time establishejkonly by Rodman's 
lony. Withoj^Northrop's erroneously conforming testiiifony, the jury would not 
have any noifis connecting Phin^fo the area in which tiffs incident occurred. 
^pps' presentecLdn alibi defense at triajnndicating his wherejroouts throughout 
the entire evening^m question. Since aJjJry is afforded the op^rtunity to believe one 
ral, it did so iq^flns case based onjjrupon Northrop's/<aroneously 
conforming testimony. Phipnp^brother, mother, bjjWher-in-law and gidmend all testified 
as to his whereabouts\jjnth them during th^vening in questkpr By conviction in this 
matter, the juiy^rose to believe Nortjirop's erroneouslj^roforming testimony over these 
four witnesses and determine<Ll!fat Phipps' mother's car was iiHhe vicinity of the cars 
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that were djyw g^ed on the nightjp^question. Had^Jerthrop been excluded, her testimony 
conformed*ffore to her origuMfTstatement, whichwdffld have indicated^ the 
jury that P h ^ T alibi defense^Js credible. The fj^ idre of Benge to exrf 
when^Jf^trial had not og^Grred until nearly ^months after the indent was 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
REDUCE PfflPPS' SENTENCE 
UTAH CODE ANN. §76-3-402(1) states as follows: 
If the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense of 
which the defendant was found guilty and to the history and character of the 
defendant, concludes it would be unduly harsh to record the conviction as 
being for that degree of offense established by statute and to sentence the 
defendant to an alternative normally applicable to that offense, the court 
may unless otherwise specifically provided by law enter a judgment of 
conviction for the next lower degree of offense and impose sentence 
accordingly. 
This Court gives deference to the trial court when reviewing issues of sentencing: 
We traditionally afford the trial court wide latitude and discretion in 
sentencing.... "An appellate court will set aside a sentence imposed by the 
trial court if the sentence represents an abuse of discretion." ... Sentencing 
requires such discretion because it "necessarily reflects the personal 
judgment of the court." ... Thus, a sentence imposed by the trial court 
should be overturned only when it is inherently unfair or clearly excessive. 
State v. Bovd. 2001 UT 30, H 31, 25 P.3d 985, citing State v. Woodland 945 P.2d 665, 
671 (Utah 1997) {quoting State v. Gibbons. 779 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Utah 1989)) (other 
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citations omitted). "An abuse of discretion results when the judge fails to consider all 
legally relevant factors or if the sentence imposed is clearly excessive." State v. 
McCovev. 803 P.2d 1234,1235 (Utah 1990) (quotations and citations omitted). 
UTAH CODE ANN. §76-6-106 (3)(btsets forth the levels*to be charged forxriminal 
mischief, as it specifically pertains to this matter, stating that ". . .any other violation of 
this section is a: (i) second degree felony if the actor's conduct causes or is intended to 
cause pecuniary loss equal to or in excess of $5,000 in value; (ii) third degree felony if the 
actor's conduct causes or is intended to cause pecuniary loss equal to or in excess of 
$1,000 but is less than $5,000 in value..." (emphasis added). 
Phipps was charged and convicted of second degree felony criminal mischief 
which requires the amount of damage be in excess of $5000.00. UTAH CODE ANN. §76-
6-106 (3)(b)(i). The damage reported by Christopher's mother to Adult Probation and 
Parole ("AP&P"), recommended by the State, and ordered as restitution by the trial court 
was $4658.00. R125 at p. 5, lines 8-12; p. 10, lines 15-16. It is axiomatic that the amount 
reported to AP&P and ordered by the trial court falls below the minimum amount for a 
second degree felony. 
The trial court should have recognized the discrepancy with the second degree 
felony charge under UTAH CODE ANN. §76-6-106 (3)(b)(i) and reduced the charge to a 
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third degree felony under UTAH CODE ANN. §76-6-106 (3)(b)(ii). Trial courts necessarily 
must uphold the standards and requirements set forth by the legislature which separate 
crimes into differing categories, else attorneys and courts would have no guidelines to 
adhere to at sentencing. As an Illinois court aptly stated, a trial court **.. .is not at liberty 
to ignore plain and unambiguous statutory language." Citv of Chicago v. Alessia. 348 
IU.App.3d 218, IlLApp. 1 Dist. (2004). The plain statutory language here requires that 
damages be in the amount exceeding $5000.00 or more. The report by the alleged victim, 
the recommendation of the State, and the trial court's restitution amount indicate that the 
parties were in agreement that the damages in this matter were in the amount of $4658.00, 
specifying a ".. .third degree felony if the actor's conduct causes or is intended to cause 
pecuniary loss equal to or in excess of $1,000 but is less than $5,000 in value." UTAH 
CODE ANN. 76-6-106 (3)(b)(ii). 
Although not objected to by Benge at or prior to the sentencing in this matter, 
Phipps requests that the preservation of this issue find exception under either plain error 
or the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel. See, State v. Hansen. 2002 UT 114, f 21, 
61 P.3d 1062 (holding "[w]hen a party fails to preserve an issue for appeal, an appellate 
court will review the issue if the appealing party can demonstrate plain error or 
exceptional circumstances; party may also assert ineffective assistance of counsel in 
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failing to preserve the issue"); citing State v. Hokate. 2000 UT 74, % 11, 10 P.3d 346; 
State v. Roth. 2001 UT 103,15,37 P.3d 1099. 
"To establish plain error, an appellant must demonstrate that: (1) an error exists, 
(2) the error should have been obvious to the trial court, and (3) the error is harmful, i.e., 
absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for 
appellant, or, phrased differently, the appellate court's confidence in the verdict is 
undermined." State v. Cruz. 2005 UT 45, f 16, - P.3d - (citations omitted). As 
demonstrated supra, an error existed in that the statutory requirements to charge Phipps 
with second degree felony criminal mischief were not met. This error should have been 
obvious to all involved since it pertained specifically to an element of the level of crime 
to charge and convict upon. Criminal mischief being the sole charge in this matter, 
absent this error, Phipps would have been charged with a third degree felony criminal 
mischief and received a sentence not to exceed five years, rather than the one to fifteen 
year sentence he received. See, UTAH CODE ANN. §76-3-203(3). With the potential ten 
(10) year difference in the sentences, the error effectively undermines the confidence in 
the verdict and the sentence imposed. 
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Alternatively, should this Court determine that the trial court did not commit plain 
error in sentencing Phipps to second degree felony criminal mischief, Phipps trial counsel 
was ineffective for failing to object to the sentence imposed. To prevail on an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim," 'a defendant must show (1) that counsel's performance was 
so deficient as to fall below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) that but for 
counsel's deficient performance there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the 
trial would have been different.'" Wickham v. Galetka. 2002 UT 72, f 19, 61 P.3d 978 
{quoting State v. Smith. 909 P.2d 236, 243 (Utah 1995)); see also Strickland v. 
Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 686-87, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). It is clear 
that there existed a discrepancy in the damages reported by the alleged victim to AP&P, 
the damages requested in the form of restitution by the State, and the restitution ordered 
by the trial court, as compared to the statutory requirements for a second degree felony 
mischief. If it was not the trial court's duty to recognize such discrepancy and correct it, 
then, as advocate for Phipps, Benge should have protected his client's rights to not be 
sentenced to a crime he did not commit. 
Benge did, in fact, raise the issue of the discrepancy in sentencing, however, he 
failed to adequately object to Phipps being sentenced to the second degree felony rather 
than a third degree felony. Benge simply inquired stating mat he did not understand the 
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discrepancy and the trial court and State indicated that the alleged victim testified that 
they ".. .didn't have all the damage fixed." Benge failed to request at that juncture that 
the charge should then be reduced since the alleged victim did not require restitution for 
the unrepaired portion. But for his failure to move for a reduction in the charge prior to 
i 
sentencing, Phipps could have received a sentence in line with a third degree felony, 
resulting in possibly ten (10) years less on his sentence. Phipps was prejudiced by 
Benge's failure to advocate on his behalf. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING AN 
UNCERTIFIED COPY OF THE TELEPHONE 
TRANSCRIPT TO BE SUBMITTED TO THE JURY 
While this issue appears to be a matter of first impression in Utah, the California 
Court of Appeals provides helpful insight into the issue pertaining to the admissibility of 
telephone transcripts, as follows: 
"[A] tape recording may be admissible even if substantial portions of it are 
unintelligible." (Ibid.) "[A] partially unintelligible tape is admissible unless 
the audible portions of the tape are so incomplete the tape's relevance is 
destroyed." (People v. Polk (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 944, 952, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 
921 (Polk ).) Transcripts of admissible tape recordings, even when admitted 
in evidence, " 'are only prejudicial if it is shown they are so inaccurate that 
the jury might be misled into convicting an innocent man.'" (Id. at p. 955, 
54 Cal.Rptr.2d 921, quoting People v. Brown (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 585, 
599, 275 CaLRptr. 268, citing People v. Fuiita (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 454, 
472-473,117 CaLRptr. 757.) 
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People v. Bavlor. 130 CalApp.4* 355, Cal.App.2 Dist. (2005). The Louisiana appeals 
court upheld the trial courts' determination not to admit a telephone transcript that was 
prepared by the State; however, the ruling was undone when the jury was permitted to 
read the transcripts. State v. Svkes. 857 So.2d 638 (La.App. 3 Cir.,2003). The Sykes 
court articulated as follows: 
By permitting the jury to see the transcripts prepared by the State, it gave 
the Prosecution the added advantage of "interpreting" difficult to 
understand audiotapes in a manner favorable to the State. Not only were the 
actual audiotapes played for the jury, but the witnesses who were recorded 
on the tapes were present to testify. The transcripts gave an unfair 
advantage to the State to present it's [sic] "version" of what was said when, 
in fact, better evidence was available. 
Id. The Svkes court determined that this tactic had denied Sykes her right to a fair trial 
under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals similarly held to the contentions of Bavlor and 
Svkes by highlighting four important procedural protections when the government offers 
a transcript in a criminal case: (1) the trial judge should reviewf ] the transcript for 
accuracy; (2) the defense counsel should be allowed to highlight alleged inaccuracies and 
to introduce alternative versions; (3) the jury should be instructed that the tape, rather 
than the transcript, was evidence; and (4) the jury should be allowed to compare the 
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transcript to the tape and hear counsel's arguments as to the meaning of the conversations. 
United States v.Delgado. 357 F.3d 1061,1070 (9th Cir.2004). 
The trial court in the instant matter allowed an uncertified copy of the transcript 
that was transcribed by a State employee to be presented to the jury after playing the 
audiotape of a cell phone message for the jury in open court. R121 at p. 138, lines 3-18; 
ruling deeming it admitted at p. 144, lines 1-17. The transcript was admitted on strong 
objection by Benge that the audiotape speaks for itself and would "substitute] the 
transcriber's ears for the jury's ears." Id. at p. 138. The trial court admitted it, 
instructing the jury that "it's what you hear on the tape that matters, not [exhibit] 14." Id. 
at p. 144. 
When comparing Exhibit 14 to the official transcripts in this record, there are 
several discrepancies. Exhibit 14 reads as follows (with expletives abbreviated): 
Hey,b—! 
Hey,b—! 
This is f—ing Vinnie, b — ! Hey, all you motherf—-ers get f—ed up. You 
tell Chris to come find me. You tell that f—ing Josh to come find me, b—. 
You whore b—-, motherf—er piece of sh—, whore bum motherf—er. 
Come find me. I'll kill all you....Fm not gonna kill anybody. I'm not 
gonna hurt anybody. I just want you guys to come talk to me, okay? Hi, 
Scott. I just want you guys to come to talk to me okay, cause I'm kind of 
offended. I thought this was dead and gone, then you get some (inaudible) 
it's over. You better come find me, whore. 
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State's Exhibit No. 14. Conversely, the official transcriber, Robin Conk, transcribed the 
phone call as follows: 
Hey, b—. Hey, b—. This is f™ing Vinnie, b — . Hey, all you motherf— 
ers get f--ed up. You tell Chris to come find me. You tell that f--ing Josh 
to come find me, b—. You whore b—, motherf—er piece of sh~. 
(Inaudible) come find me. I can't wait (inaudible). I'm okay, but I'm not 
going to hurt anybody. I just want you guys to come and talk to me. Okay? 
Okay? (Inaudible). I want to talk to them. Talk to me. Okay? (Inaudible) 
You better come and find me (inaudible). 
R121 at p. 137. As is evident, the number of "inaudibles" in the court reporter's account 
of the message while being played for the jury is greater than those contained in the 
uncertified transcript that was admitted into evidence. Compare R121 at p. 137, line(s) 3-
15; and State's Exhibit No. 14. The court reporter has a total of five (5) inaudibles where 
they were uncertain as to what was being said, while the uncertified transcription of 
State's Exhibit No. 14 has only one (1) inaudible. 
Taking into account the procedural protections adopted by the Delgado court, it is 
clear that the trial court should have undertaken further analysis before admitting State's 
Exhibit No. 14. The trial court itself did not review the transcript for accuracy. Delgado. 
Benge was not given the opportunity to highlight alleged inaccuracies and to introduce 
alternative versions. Id. Additionally, the jury was also not allowed to hear the parties 
arguments as to the differing versions and meanings of the audiotape. Id. 
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The only Delgado procedure the trial court undertook in the instant matter was to 
instruct the jury that the audiotape was the evidence and that the uncertified transcript was 
to aid them. R121 at p. 144, lines 2-3. As shown by Sykes. supra, by allowing the jury to 
see the uncertified transcript, the State was given the added advantage of "interpreting" 
difficult to understand audiotapes in a manner favorable to the State. Sykes. As with 
Svkes. the uncertified transcripts gave an unfair advantage to the State to present its 
version of what was said when, in fact, better evidence was available. Id. This unfair 
advantage prejudiced Phipps in denying him his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing, Phipps respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse the Judgment and enter other such orders as this Court deems appropriate. 
DATED TfflS day of , 2005. 
K. Andrew Fitzgerald 
Attorney for Vincent Lawrence Phipps 
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The only Delgado procedure the trial court undertook in the instant matter was to 
instruct the jury that the audiotape was the evidence and that the uncertified transcript 
was to aid them. R121 at p. 144, lines 2-3. As shown by Sykes, supra, by allowing the 
jury to see the uncertified transcript, the State was given the added advantage of 
"interpreting" difficult to understand audiotapes in a manner favorable to the State. 
Sykes. As with Sykes, the uncertified transcripts gave an unfair advantage to the State to 
present its version of what was said when, in fact, better evidence was available. Id. 
This unfair advantage prejudiced Phipps in denying him his Sixth Amendment right to a 
fair trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing, Phipps respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse the Judgment and enter other such orders as this Court deems appropriate. 
DATED THIS 28^ day of October, 2005. 
K. Andrew FitzgeraldV 
Attorney for Vincen|Xawrence Phipps 
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Addendum ~I~ 
Judgment and Commitment to Utah State Prison, 
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mum 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Criminal No. 0417-133 
Held in the Courtroom of said Court, at Moab, Grand 
County, State of Utah, on March 1, 2005, present the Honorable 
Lyle R. Anderson, District Court Judge. 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Against: VINCENT LAWRENCE PHIPPS, 
DOB: 08/12/1981 
JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT TO UTAH STATE PRISON 
H. J. Morgan for Plaintiff 
William L. Benge for Defendant 
This being the day and hour fixed for pronouncing 
judgment in this case, and the defendant being present in Court 
and represented by counsel, and defendant having heretofore been 
found guilty by a jury of the offense of: CRIMINAL MISCHIEF, a 
SECOND DEGREE FELONY, and the defendant stating to the Court that 
there is no legal reason to advance why judgment should not be 
pronounced, the Court now pronounces the judgment and sentence of 
the law as follows, to-wit: That you, VINCENT LAWRENCE PHIPPS, 
are hereby imprisoned in the UTAH STATE PRISON for a term of NOT 
fl%(k 
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LESS THAN ONE (1) NOR MORE THAN FIFTEEN (15) YEARS to be served 
concurrently with case #0417-217 and pay restitution in the total 
amount of $4,658.09 to: 
Allstate Insurance: Claim Office, P. 0. Box 57995, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84157: Refer to date of loss, 12/27/2003, 
and claim numbers 1315666873, 1315672699, and 1315666881. 
You, VINCENT LAWRENCE PHIPPS, are hereby remanded to 
the custody of the Grand County Sheriff or other proper officer 
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,*"^  
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the \C)&\ day of March, 2005, I hand 
delivered or mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of 
the above to William L. Benge, Attorney for Defendant, 712 Judge 
Building, 8 East Broadway (300 South), Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111; Department of Corrections, Adult Probation and Parole, 
1165 S. Hwy. 191, St. 3, Moab, Utah 84532, Grand County Sheriff, 
125 East Center Street, Moab, Utah 84532; Grand County Attorney, 
125 East Center Street, Moab, Utah 84532; Utah State Prison, PO 
BOX 250, Draper, Utah 84020. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Addendum ~II~ 
Jury Instruction No. 6, 
dated January 21, 2005 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
A defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. This presumption follows the defendant 
throughout the trial. If a defendant's guilt is not shown beyond 
a reasonable doubt, the defendant should be acquitted. 
The state must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt is not proof to an absolute certainty. 
Reasonable doubt is a doubt based on reason, which is reasonable in 
view of all the evidence. Reasonable doubt is not a doubt based on 
fancy, imagination, or wholly speculative possibility. Proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt is enough proof to satisfy the mind, or 
convince the understanding of those bound to act conscientiously, 
and enough to eliminate reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is a 
doubt that reasonable people would entertain based upon the 
evidence in the case. 
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Addendum ~III~ 
Defendant's Exhibit No. 17', Statement Form, 
Aaron J. Rodman, dated December 28, 2003 
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Statement Form 
63--errs ~~l 
Case Report Number. OtiGfa W 
MO AB CI. 
POLICE 
DEPARTMENT 
.ate: /2/X^//).% Time: 
ame:
 kfkron—H knAmar\ Date 
ddress: (oHI f U rHfi.MrP. QL 
. City:. £Laah 
ofBirth: 3 / / ^ / Q 
State: U±_ ZIP_Hf^>k 
tone: ISllL^lX 
E SJ5l Wgt: /35~ 
_ s.s.# r 2 ? ~ iZztZtiL DL#. 
Hair. h/OHsf Eves: Nrj^QJ 
St. 
Race: jbZ. Male j ^ " Female [ 
L E A S E READ BEFORE FILLING OUT THIS FORM 
3U are notified that statements you are about to make may be admitted in court. You do solemnly swear that the evidence you shall give 
this matter shall be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, under the penalties of perjury. 
give the following statement to officers of the Moab City Police 
apartment, freely, voluntarily, and without promise of leniency and swear that it is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. 
JL*JL£iil JU k. 
OOlxV \ • ZQ. da 
J, (>Q^.^ , \ vV w ^ ^ V>e^L- ^ Q ^ -• \ \ >-i<a, 
CO Avv\ &. > 
>D 1 10>gY\4- QLsAz£>Ld£ V Y / > u U 
e. A, w ^ V , u ^ a <^  u - ^ W V ^VCv-V- 4- O^ b a \ \ frxr^. £>YA Cc*.^>. 
SA-<3n^)vx i g o n -\V\4 y > v ^ V v coC - \ W 
± ^ & Q^de_ , -VV-SL-V^ i^Q-S -Vr> £ ^ k l Quc^o^y A<3 S*g 
^n red*heaCh P a 9 e ° f t W s s*^6"1®"1- e a c f i ° f which bears my signature, and corrections, if any bear my initials, and i certify that the facts 
ainec nerem are true and correct I understand that the statement above is my own and that the same may be presented in court I hearby 
ir or affirm that the same is true, and I understand that if same is false, such fact may be punishable by law. 
Witness: A\ &Z3a&&L (\ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ -
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Addendum ~IV~ 
Defendant's Exhibit No. 18, Statement Form, 
Liz Northrup, dated December 28, 2003. 
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Statement Form 
^ - 431* 
Case Report Number: % 
% 
l n vimA *mn m • i 
POLICE 
DEPARTMENT 
\UJ±S222 
•e: U ? . C&E&lXLXg 
.Time: ^ ' O Q P . f W 
Date 
ress: citv: W \ n r K b 
of Birth: ' " W j u A 
_ State: ]jtX_ ZIP^. 
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EASE READ BEFORE FILLING OUT THIS FORM 
i are notified that statements you are about to make may be admitted in court. You do solemnly swear that the evidence you shall give 
lis matter shall be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, under the penalties of perjury. 
y\&&^op give the following statement to officers of the Moab City Police 
>artment, freely^voluntarily, and without promise of leniency and swear that it is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. 
^LNiSV? >•}• ^ > - ^ w ^ s ~ ^^ \ ^ fly^ \m/\*~ ^ v v v v ^ <y x •—" ^r*-*— 
ave read each page of this statement, each of which bears my signature, and corrections, if any bear my initials, and I certify that the facte 
itained herein are true and correct I understand that the statement above is my own and that the same may be presented m court. I nearoy 
ear or affirwi that the same is true, and I understand that if same is false, such fact may be punishable by law. 
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